Introduction
Few international developments are as desirable but, at the same time, as controversial as economic globalisation. While the potential gains of the process of economic globalisation are considerable, these gains will not be achieved without careful management and regulation of this process. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted in April 2000, when presenting the United Nations Millennium Report to the UN General Assembly, that:
… the overarching challenge of our times is to make globalization mean more than bigger markets. To make a success of this great upheaval, we must learn how to govern better, and -above all -how to govern better together. We need to make our States stronger and more effective at the national level. And we need to get them working together on global issues, all pulling their weight and all having their say.
[Emphasis added]
Joseph Stiglitz described, in Globalization and its Discontents, the current situation with respect to global economic governance as follows:
… we have a system that might be called global governance without global government, one in which a few institutions -the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO -and a few players -the finance, commerce, and trade ministries, closely linked to certain financial and commercial interests -dominate the scene, but in which those affected by their decisions are left almost voiceless. It's time to change some of the rules governing the international economic order, to think once again about how decisions get made at the international level -and in whose interests -and to place less emphasis on ideology and to look more at what works. Representative Charlene Barshefsky noted that 'the WTO has outgrown the processes appropriate to an earlier time' and argued for procedures which had a greater degree of internal transparency and inclusion to accommodate a larger and more diverse membership. challenges facing the WTO and considers how the organisation could be reformed to meet these challenges.
Given its subject matter, the Sutherland Report was at the core of the discussions at the international research conference, entitled 'In Search of Effective Global Economic associations and NGOs to discuss issues relating to the institutional reforms needed to transform the WTO into a more effective instrument of global economic governance. At the conference, four main issues were discussed: first, the possible improvements to, and alternatives for, consensus decision-making in the WTO; second, transparency, democratic legitimacy and the participation of civil society in WTO decision-making; third, secondary law-making by WTO bodies; and fourth, an expanded role for the WTO Secretariat. This article summarises the main arguments made at the conference.
Improvements to, and alternatives for, consensus decision-making
The general session on 'Improvements to, and alternatives for, consensus decision-making in 
Consensus decision-making
The first issue under discussion concerned consensus decision-making in the WTO. As pointed out by one of the panelists, an analysis of decision-making rules and practices of international organisations shows that decision-making by international organisations has evolved over time. In nineteenth and early twentieth century international organisations, most decisions were taken by unanimity. Whilst different variations of the unanimity rule existed, the requirement of unanimity was, in all cases, seen as a consequence of the principle of state sovereignty. For example, the League of Nations, the first universal international organisation with a general mandate, took decisions by unanimity. A striking exception to the general rule of decision-making by unanimity at that time was the International Labour Organization, which could take decisions by majority vote. International organisations established during or shortly after the Second World War often provided for decision-making by majority vote.
This development has been explained by the spirit of cooperation prevailing at that time, as well as by the dominant role played by the United States and its traditions of democracy and majority vote at home. However, the practice of decision-making in international organisations soon showed that states were not ready to accept decision-making by majority vote and did, in fact, regularly resort to decision-making by consensus. Subsequently, and in particular in the last three decades, decision-making by consensus has been increasingly included also in formal decision-making rules of international organisations. If a new international organisation is established today, it is likely that its charter will provide for decision-making by consensus, not for decision-making by voting. The most common explanation for this development, according to the panelist, is that in many organisations voting majorities were held by a large number of small and/or weak members that could adopt any decision, including decisions involving considerable costs, which would sooner or later alienate the more powerful members from the organisation.
Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement provides:
The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under the GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter will be decided by voting. In spite of these problems, many panelists and participants in the discussion spoke out in defence of decision-making by consensus in the WTO, for they considered it to be a valuable means of ensuring widespread support for decisions and their implementation. Decisionmaking by consensus gives all Members, regardless of their political and/or economic influence, the 'possibility' of blocking a decision by formally objecting to it. This 'veto right', no matter how exceptional its actual use may be, in particular gives small Members without economic clout some guarantee that decisions cannot just be imposed on them. If a proposed decision is incompatible with a Member's vital economic interests, this Member can block this decision. It is clear that a decision which a Member considers to be incompatible with its vital economic interests, but which is nevertheless forced upon it, will give rise to major implementation problems. As one contributor stated, it would be extremely difficult for a
Member to implement a decision to which it was strongly opposed. Politically, the government of such a Member would experience major difficulties in explaining to its constituency why a decision which is incompatible with its vital economic interests should be adhered to and incorporated into national law and policy. and/or necessitate new decision-making methods for the WTO. In judging the appropriateness of specific decision-making methods, the very character of the WTO, now and in the future, is thus decisive. As one participant pointed out, it is important in the discussion on decisionmaking to address the question whether the WTO is to be an organisation balancing the interests of its Members in the area of trade and related spheres, or an instrument of global governance serving global interests.
Most participants to the discussion endorsed the idea that, in the search for possible improvements to, and alternatives for, consensus decision-making in the WTO, it is very important to distinguish between different types of decisions taken in the WTO context. For some types of decisions, recourse to decision-making methods other than consensus may be more acceptable than for other types. Panelists and con participants in the discussion made several suggestions with regard to a possible typology of WTO decisions. One participant distinguished between so-called 'housekeeping' decisions (concerned with internal matters of the organisation), 'day-to-day' decisions regarding the application and interpretation of existing rules and decisions by which new rules are created. According to this participant, consensus decision-making should remain for the two last mentioned types of decisions, whereas for the first type of decisions, decision-making by voting should be accepted.
Another participant distinguished between decisions affecting rights and obligations of
Members and decisions with no such effect; only the first category of decisions should be adopted by consensus. Most participants agreed that it is essential to distinguish between decisions concerning substantive issues and decisions on procedural issues and that a categorisation of decisions going beyond the 'substance-procedure' distinction might be quite helpful. Several discussants warned, however, that no categorisation of decisions is as straightforward as it might appear and must therefore be given careful attention. One panelist stressed, for instance, that the very question of whether a decision is of a substantive or of a procedural nature tends to be considered a substantive issue.
Another important area that, according to many participants in the discussion, requires proper consideration and exploration concerns the relationship between WTO decision-making procedures and regional trade arrangements. The Sutherland Report suggests that the proliferation of such arrangements is a result of the difficulties that the WTO has had adopting decisions by consensus. According to some participants, this is an assumption that deserves more careful examination. One participant proposed, furthermore, an analysis of the decisionmaking procedures of successful regional trade arrangements in order to learn from the positive experiences of these arrangements. This participant also suggested that organising WTO Members into regional groups and looking at decision-making from a regional Another means to facilitate decision-making within the WTO is to abandon, in specific cases, the ambition to conclude a multilateral agreement (involving all Members) and aim for a plurilateral agreement (involving only a group of Members). The Sutherland Report makes a suggestion along these lines. Many participants in the discussion considered this plurilateral approach to decision-making to be worthy of further examination. More frequent use of plurilateral agreements might provide for a solution in situations where no consensus of all WTO Members can be reached.
Several panelists and many participants in the discussion referred to the recommendation in the Sutherland Report to require a Member considering blocking a measure which has broad support among other Members, to declare that the matter at hand is of vital national interest to it. Such a 'consensus blocking declaration' would need to be given in writing and would have to include reasons. Some participants supported this proposal, stating that such a mechanism would increase the political 'cost' of blocking consensus and discipline the substance of the objection by forcing the opposing Member to state substantive reasons. Other participants feared that this suggestion is politically not acceptable to most WTO Members.
Although most panelists and participants in the discussion did not see a shift from consensus decision-making to decision-making by vote as an actual possibility for the near future of the WTO, they agreed that alternative methods of decision-making should be examined.
Particular attention should, in this respect, go to decision-making by weighted vote. As already stated above, a voting system in which each Member has one vote is out of touch with political and economic reality. It is therefore not acceptable. One panelist presented the results of research on the factors that could be taken into account in determining the weight to be given to the vote of a Member in WTO decision-making. These factors include a Member's share of world trade, its market openness and the size of its population. For the adoption of a decision, a qualified majority or double majority may be required. It is important that any future voting rules take into account the stake that major trading entities have in the WTO system, but at the same time do not allow them to block single-handedly the adoption of decisions. Several participants addressed the use of particular factors to determine the weight of votes, but further discussion focused especially on the general issues of legitimacy and efficacy of decision-making by vote. With regard to legitimacy, one participant referred to the current difficulties of the IMF and the World Bank and their decreasing 'popularity' caused, according to that participant, mostly by improper and unfair use of the weighted majority voting system which often forced Members to implement decisions which they are strongly opposed to. As to efficacy, several participants noted that decision-making by vote undoubtedly leads to the more efficient adoption of decisions. This view was, however, not shared by others, who emphasised the core advantage of consensus decision-making, already referred to above, namely ensuring the widest possible support for the decisions so adopted.
By definition, such a degree of support would be missing from decisions adopted by majority vote. A number of participants stressed that the efficacy of decision-making must not be judged (primarily) on the basis of the swiftness with which decisions are adopted, but on the basis of the actual implementation of these decisions after adoption. Whilst it is quite controversial, in the discussion on decision-making by vote, specific attention should also be paid to the legal consequences of a decision for a Member which voted against it. Should such decision be binding upon that Member? It is obvious that the non-application of decisions on
Members that were opposed to their adoption is likely to result in a fragmentation of the WTO system, undermining its efficacy.
While many panelists and participants in the discussion expressed strong reservations with regard to decision-making by vote within the WTO, there was broad support in the discussion for the view that the so-called 'shadow of voting' might enhance efficacy of the WTO decision-making considerably. Many participants agreed that the mere possibility of calling for a vote -and the threat of being outvoted -would stimulate the readiness of participants in the decision-making process to make concessions and reach consensus. As observed above, this 'threat' of decision-making by vote is currently already provided for in Article IX of the WTO Agreement. The question is, however, how to make this 'threat' credible. The WTO is portrayed, by many, as a secretive organisation in which the governments (of a few major trading nations), unsupervised by parliaments or civil society, set the agenda and push through rules that affect the welfare of people worldwide. While the WTO has made significant efforts in recent years to become more transparent, democratic and open to civil society, most panelists and participants in the discussion agreed that much remains to be done.
Transparency, democratic legitimacy and participation of civil society
A number of panelists and participants expressed grave concern regarding the level of distrust and misunderstanding of the WTO and its activities, not only in the general public but also, quite distressingly, among leaders and officials of WTO Members. One panelist forcefully argued that the WTO was, more than ever, losing the battle for the hearts and minds of the people and expressed worries for the very existence of the WTO in the future. These worries were not generally shared. Most participants agreed, however, that civil society's lack of knowledge of the WTO and its activities needs to be addressed and that the WTO itself, as well as the Member governments, have an important role to play in this respect. It was said that the WTO should adopt a much more proactive, even aggressive, approach to its own promotion and the promotion of the multilateral trading system than it has adopted to date.
Furthermore, it is important for the WTO to engage in a critical examination of its 'culture', its customs and its practices, some aspects of which are directly related to the high levels of distrust and misunderstanding of the WTO. As one panelist stated, the WTO has taken over much of the 'culture', the customs and the practices of the GATT and reminds some of 'an old man in new clothing'. According to this panelist, the WTO must 'rejuvenate' itself and develop a 'culture', customs and practices corresponding to the demands of the international community of the 21 st century. These demands and the appropriate responses to them should be the subject-matter of future research. More generally, it was agreed that any research on decision-making in the WTO would need to give considerable attention to the issues of transparency, democratic legitimacy and the participation of civil society.
Problems regarding transparency, democratic legitimacy, democratic control, accountability and the participation of civil society were said to be very much interrelated, yet not identical.
Several participants expressed the view that, before any substantial research on these issues might begin, the above mentioned terms ought to be defined in order to provide researchers with a common conceptual framework. Although some participants in the discussion pointed to the fact that much research had already been done, especially by political scientists, other participants emphasised the need for specific legal definitions of the terms at issue. This will, however, be a complicated task; as several participants emphasised, concepts such as 'democracy' and 'transparency' often hold different meanings for different WTO Members due to a range of historical, political and cultural factors.
Transparency
With regard to transparency, several participants emphasised that the level of distrust and misunderstanding of the WTO -one participant used the term 'paranoia' in this context -is, to an important extent, due to the lack of transparency in the WTO. In fairness, it should be noted that the WTO has made efforts to increase transparency. In July 1996, the General Council Under the new rules, the time-period for de-restriction has been reduced to an average of six to twelve weeks (compared with the previous time-period of eight to nine months). Also, the WTO website has received much praise. should identify what further steps need to be undertaken as well as their possible impact on the operation of the WTO. Several participants were of the opinion that transparency is not an objective in itself, but rather a means to take the best decision for all parties concerned.
Therefore attention must also be paid to legitimate interests of WTO Members and officials in maintaining confidentiality. Cultural differences with respect to transparency were noted, too.
For example, while the presence of cameras in court rooms in the United States is common, in
Europe cameras are mostly banned. In identifying appropriate and broadly acceptable means of enhancing transparency in the WTO, cultural and other differences between Members may not be disregarded.
Several participants in the discussion, furthermore, emphasised that, when deciding on the appropriate means of enhancing transparency in the WTO, it is important to take into account the differences in the nature of the activities conducted. The issue of transparency of negotiations on new rules is different from the issue of transparency of dispute settlement proceedings. Hence, the appropriate level and means of transparency in dispute settlement may well differ from those in decision-making.
Finally, several participants stressed the importance of transparency at the national level.
According to them, transparency in the WTO has to be complemented by transparency at the national level. Therefore, the actual situation in the WTO Members States should be investigated, too.
Democratic legitimacy
With regard to the issue of democratic legitimacy, one panelist offered an analysis of the (un)suitability/(in)compatibility of the traditional model of democratic legitimacy of international law and decisions of international organisations to effective global governance.
As the panelist explained, this traditional model is based on two elements: first, it is based on parliamentary consent to international treaties; secondly, it is based on accountability and parliamentary control of government and its officials. According to the panelist, this traditional model is insufficient for effective global governance because of the problems caused by the 'interconnectedness' of national and international regulation, dissolution of the 'seat of responsibility' and incongruence of the governed and the governors. As stated by this panellist, the so-called 'legitimacy chain', the chain between those making decisions and those affected by the decisions, is too long and not transparent. In reality, there is in almost all WTO Members States little national parliamentary involvement in, or meaningful control of, the WTO rule-making process, while the rules agreed on extend deeply into the national economic and social order and are legally binding and enforceable. As a result, there is a gap of democratic legitimacy in global economic governance that needs to be closed. The panelist outlined some possible solutions to this situation. Of these possible solutions, he did not support the 'turning back the clock' by the re-nationalisation of economic governance or the internationalization of parliamentary control (which is much in vogue at present). Instead, he
proposed 'a radical-democratic approach', consisting of the parliamentarisation of foreign and trade policy. He advocated challenging the traditional executive dominance of foreign and trade policy, arguing that law-making at the international level needs to be as much 'parliamentary law-making' as at the national level.
Many participants in the discussion agreed with the panelist that the efficiency of an international organisation such as the WTO requires democratic legitimacy. Most of these participants agreed that the increased involvement of national parliaments would indeed lead to enhanced democratic legitimacy. One participant noted, however, that the question whether the government officials of Members are indeed 'representatives' of their own citizens is 'taboo' in the WTO. Some participants suggested that the democratic legitimacy of the WTO could also be enhanced by increasing the participation of civil society, particularly nongovernmental organisations, in the WTO. This suggestion was, however, controversial.
According to one participant, NGOs are not an expression of democracy. Although many NGOs perform useful activities, they are, themselves, neither 'representative' nor 'accountable' and they are thus unable to fill the democratic legitimacy gap.
Participation of civil society
Over the last decade, NGOs have demanded a greater role in WTO decision-making. Article V:2 of the WTO Agreement empowers the General Council to:
… make appropriate arrangements for consultations and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.
On 18 July 1996, the General Council adopted a set of guidelines clarifying the framework for relations with NGOs. In these guidelines, the General Council: Some discussants feared, however, that any such classification effort might be perceived as being politically motivated and aimed at separating 'politically correct' NGOs from others.
A number of participants in the discussion insisted that any involvement of NGOs in WTO activities should be conditional upon an investigation of their 'representativeness', accountability and the origins of their funding, in order to distinguish between 'serious' NGOs and others. One participant stressed the need to draw up a code of conduct for NGOs.
It was noted that the Sutherland Report rejected the need for an accreditation system for NGOs. However, a number of participants took issue with this conclusion, pointing out that many other international organisations had developed such a system and reportedly benefited from it. Although some participants were of the opinion that the WTO differs from other international organisations to such an extent that the experience of these organisations with the accreditation of NGOs is not relevant to the WTO, other participants strongly disagreed and supported the call for comparative research. In a more general sense, the experiences of international organisations (and the European Union) with NGOs and, in particular, the effects of enhanced participation of NGOs on the functioning of these organisations were considered very interesting and worth looking into in more detail. The appraisal of the current state of affairs and the recommendations of the Sutherland Report were considered by many participants as insufficient. In the words of one panelist, the WTO's relationship with NGOs needs to be updated and rationalised, but the Sutherland Report does not provide a good basis for this. The Report fails to address the governance issues behind the changing scope of the WTO and the nature and role of NGOs in policy-making processes. It defers problems onto Members, without setting any compulsion for them to address these issues.
Secondary law-making by WTO bodies
The session on 'Secondary Law-making by WTO Bodies' was chaired by Prof. dr. Ramses A. In his introductory remarks, the chair of this session noted that the most decisive element distinguishing international conferences from international organisations is that the latter have a procedure allowing for the adoption of decisions. While international conferences result, in general and if successful, in the conclusion of an international agreement, international organisations are forums where decisions can be, and are, adopted not only by the Members of the organisation concerned but also by its institutional bodies. According to the chair, the remarkably small volume of secondary rule-making in the WTO compared to the volume of rule-making in other international organisations raises questions regarding the true nature of the WTO.
In response, one of the panelists noted, however, that the volume of secondary rule-making in the WTO is not as exceptional as it might seem. The panelist subsequently offered an analysis of the legal basis for such rule-making in the WTO and presented some problems related to it.
According to the panelist, WTO secondary rule-making may be based on either expressed or implied authority. Expressed authority to adopt decisions is provided for in two manners. -making) , for example, the rules on the burden of proof and the principles of due process and good faith.
As emphasised by the panelist, secondary law-making is, in general, an under-explored area requiring a substantive legal study. This is the case not only in the WTO but also in other international organisations, In the context of the WTO, research should be undertaken in order to analyse secondary law-making, and to investigate its role in the organisation as well as its contribution (or non-contribution) to the normative development of the organisation. The extent to which the WTO bodies exercise secondary law-making capacity and rule referencing offer possible research questions. With regard to rule-referencing, the panelist identified three main problems that call for clarification. First, the extent to which the incorporation into WTO law of 'referenced' rules and standards of other international organisations takes place, as well as the effect of these rules in the WTO legal order. Second, the influence of the WTO on the development of 'referenced' rules and standards. Third, the possibility of direct effect of 'referenced' rules.
Some participants in the discussion suggested that the concept of secondary law-making should be further clarified before any substantive research is undertaken. Unlike the panelist, who included rule-referencing into this concept, they considered that rule-referencing falls outside the scope of this concept and should be studied separately. Some participants also argued that any future research into secondary rule-making should give appropriate attention to issues such as the principle of attribution of powers and the notion of implied powers, softlaw issues including institutional questions as well as questions of the legal effects of soft law rules.
The second panelist emphasised the need for an appropriate comparative analysis of the WTO with other international organisations with respect to secondary rule-making. According to this panelist, comparative issues are being unjustifiably neglected in the WTO as a result of the unreasonable conviction, held by many WTO Members, that the WTO is different from other international organisations due to its 'Member-driven' character. This was also said to be one of the reasons for the (comparatively) rather primitive institutional structure of the WTO.
Further reasons identified by the panelist were the 'last minute creation' of the organisation and the restrictive nature of the negotiation mandates given by the future WTO Members to their representatives/negotiators. As a result, the WTO is something between an international conference and an international organisation, an entity the legal character of which needs further clarification. If the WTO is to be an international organisation and an instrument of effective global governance, it needs to obtain more independence from its Members rather than to be 'Member-driven'. As the WTO is a dynamic entity, it must be able to respond to new challenges and transform itself. According to the panelist, academia can play an important role in this process by carefully analysing the current situation and suggesting possible alternatives.
With regard to secondary rule-making, the panelist emphasised that future research should examine the secondary rule-making processes in ( 
Expanded role for the WTO Secretariat
The One panelist offered an explanation why different Members might reject the idea of a stronger
Secretariat. This panelist argued that the largest Members might feel that they can exercise more leverage over the staff when the Secretariat is small and that a larger Secretariat would be harder to oversee, and thus more difficult to control, in order to assure the safeguarding and advancement of its own interests. Another fear of larger Members could be that an expanded Secretariat would make the WTO become as inefficient as the United Nations. As the panelist pointed out, the fact that the Secretariat is under-resourced indicates that those who contribute most to the WTO budget do not see it as in their interest to increase significantly the size of the Secretariat. On the other hand, the panelist presumed that small developed country Members would be very positive about the idea of a stronger Secretariat with more resources and the ability to defend the multilateral trading system. With regard to developing country Members, the panelist stated that one would also expect them to be in favour of a larger and more active Secretariat, for such a Secretariat could help them to preserve their rights and meet their obligations. However, many developing country Members tend to distrust the Secretariat and do not support enhancing its role in the WTO. As the panelist explained, the negative feeling of developing country Members may be due to the fact that these Members consider that the Secretariat and, in particular, the Director-General, tends to favour the larger players during negotiations, in order that an agreement is reached.
They also criticise the way in which technical assistance and capacity building is provided by the Secretariat, stressing that the Secretariat, instead of helping developing country Members to acquire the necessary expertise, seems more aimed at transforming their negotiating positions. However, as the panelist concluded, there are strong arguments in favor of a larger and stronger WTO Secretariat, especially from efficiency and equity perspectives. There is a need for more technical assistance and capacity building; a need for support, facilitation and help to broker agreements and forge consensus; a need for better interaction with the media and civil society to respond to demands for external transparency and, more generally, the advancement of the organisation's interests. These needs can, however, only be met with a larger, more independent Secretariat. countries.
In the area of implementation of WTO agreements including technical assistance, the panelist suggested enhancing the role of the Secretariat by, for example, monitoring implementation of notification obligations by Members and by taking action in default, such as 'naming and shaming' in regular reports to Committees. He also advocated a mandate for the WTO Secretariat for independent action to prepare studies on relevant topics without prior approval by Members; and a mandate to make first assessments of notified regional trade agreements.
The panelist emphasised that the role of the Secretariat should include an independent policy advice on best practice and gaps in the system. The trade policy review reports could be a very useful source of 'inspiration' for such independent policy advice on best practice and gaps in the system. With regard to technical assistance and capacity building, the panelist expressed the opinion that the WTO should not become a development organisation and that the role of the WTO Secretariat would change if poorer WTO Members had a contractual 'right' to technical assistance to implement (new) WTO obligations.
In the area of dispute settlement, the role of the WTO Secretariat should be clarified and demystified. According to the panelist, this could be achieved by, for example, separating clearly the role of the Secretariat in servicing panels from its role in servicing negotiations and assisting in implementation of agreements. Eventually, these distinct roles should be assigned to clearly separated entities, and the role of servicing panels could be assigned to the Secretariat of the Permanent Panel Body (if and when such a Body will be established). The WTO Secretariat currently prepares background documents on the issues arising in a particular dispute for panels. According to the panelist, making these background documents public would bring transparency to the supportive role of the WTO Secretariat. Least developed country Members should make more use of the good offices of the WTO DirectorGeneral under Article 5 of the DSU and Article 24.2 of the DSU. There is, according to this panelist, no further need for legal assistance to Members in disputes in view of the existence of the Advisory Center on WTO Law. However, the Center does require more funding from all OECD countries.
In the area of research and communication, there should also be more room for manoeuvre for the Director-General and the research division of the Secretariat to undertake and publish policy studies on topical issues. Since research does not affect the rights of Members; they should, according to the panelist, 'be less uptight' about this. The same holds true for communications to a wider audience, in particular outreach to civil society and industry in developing countries, and acting as advocate for the multilateral trading system.
The panelist emphasised that some proposals for institutional improvements should be taken up immediately because of the need for progress in the Doha Development Round. A transparent and 'democratic' selection process for the appointment of the new DirectorGeneral, selected on merit and not geography, was said to be a good starting point to build on, if mistakes in the past are not to be repeated. The need to avoiding the politicisation of the Secretariat was stressed as well. However, the panelist was of an opinion that not much research in this area was necessary, since an enhanced role of the WTO Secretariat was more a matter of a political decision being taken by the WTO Members.
Most participants to the discussion did not question the potential and/or the need for an enhanced role of the Secretariat, although they were critical with respect to the suggestion of the Sutherland Report that the Secretariat should become a 'guardian of the treaties'. One participant commented that the European Commission model is not applicable to the WTO because of the non-existence of a treaty to be guarded. According to that participant, WTO Members often regard WTO agreements as unfair and wish their modification rather than their protection. In the view of most participants, any discussion on enhancing the role of the Secretariat must be preceded by a serious scrutiny of the functioning and the internal management of the Secretariat. Several participants also emphasised that any enhancement of the role of the Secretariat must be accompanied by guarantees of its independence and impartiality. One participant expressed serious doubts about the independence of certain WTO staff members at present. He pointed to experiences with some WTO officials having strong personal convictions and feared the negative influence of such persons, for example, on the negotiation or advisory activities of the Secretariat. An independent agency entrusted with initiative and consulting functions appeared, to this participant, to be a better alternative. This participant stressed, furthermore, that the composition of the Secretariat should reflect better the composition of the WTO membership and should thus include more nationals of developing country Members.
Other participants also emphasised the requirements of independence and impartiality of the WTO Secretariat. One participant quoted, in this regard, words that an international organisation must 'belong to all member states and to none of them' and suggested that future research would investigate whether this is the state of affairs in the WTO. Another participant stressed the connection between independence and accountability of international bureaucracies and between accountability and transparency. He expressed the view that, without greater transparency of the WTO Secretariat, it would not be feasible to enhance its role and to charge it with new tasks. It was also said that any independence and transparency of the Secretariat is dependent on the approach of the WTO Members towards the staff of the organisation and their confidence in it.
With regard to the Director-General, most participants in the discussion agreed with the Sutherland Report that his mandate should, indeed, be clarified, although one participant noted that a clarification of the mandate of the Director-General will not suffice to ensure that the Director-General plays a more effective and influential role. The participant believed that the personality of the Director-General is of a greater importance. Doubts were also expressed with regard to the recommendations of the Sutherland Report that the Director-General would play a more proactive role in the negotiations as well as play the role of an honest broker in the negotiations. According to one participant, these two tasks are mutually exclusive and a choice between them will, therefore, have to be made.
In conclusion, most participants in the discussion agreed that the WTO Secretariat needs to be better equipped not to 'drive', but to facilitate the functioning of, the WTO. An analysis of the current situation, and an examination of possible changes and their consequences, are therefore of significant interest and must be added to the research agenda.
Conclusion

31
As stated above, the objective of the research conference entitled 'In Search of Effective Global Economic Governance: The Case of the World Trade Organization' was to define a comprehensive agenda for research into the institutional reform of the WTO. It is important that legal and political science scholars focus their research efforts on the reforms needed to transform the WTO into an instrument of effective global economic governance. The discussions at the conference, as summarised in this article, highlight the complexity of the issues to be addressed and confirm the need for further research.
